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Abstract
According to comparativism, degrees of belief are reducible to a system of purely 
ordinal comparisons of relative confidence. (For example, being more confident that 
P than that Q, or being equally confident that P and that Q.) In this paper, I raise sev-
eral general challenges for comparativism, relating to (1) its capacity to illuminate 
apparently meaningful claims regarding intervals and ratios of strengths of belief, 
(2) its capacity to draw enough intuitively meaningful and theoretically relevant dis-
tinctions between doxastic states, and (3) its capacity to handle common instances of 
irrationality.
1 Introduction
Meet Sally. Like the rest of us, Sally has beliefs, broadly construed—there’s some 
way she takes the world to be that’s generally responsive to her evidence, and which 
along with her desires guides her behaviour. This paper concerns what Sally’s 
beliefs might be like at the most fundamental level, and the relationship between the 
different types of beliefs she might be taken to have.
To get the ball rolling, I’m going to assume that Sally has at least two kinds of 
belief: partial and comparative. With respect to the former, Sally is, for instance, 
quite certain there’s an external world, uncertain about the consequences of global 
warming, but doubtful they’ll be good. These are attitudes directed towards indi-
vidual propositions, each coming with some (possibly vague or imprecise) degree 
of strength that can at least sometimes be represented numerically. Her comparative 
beliefs, on the other hand, relate pairs of propositions, and do not come in degrees. 
Sally is, for example, more confident that she’ll find good coffee in Melbourne than 
she will in Sydney, and indeed just as confident that she’ll find good coffee in Syd-
ney as that she’ll win the lottery next week. If there’s also a sense in which Sally has 
‘all-or-nothing’ beliefs, then we’ll assume that these derive in one way or another 
from the facts about her partial and/or comparative beliefs.
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Taking all that for granted, it’s natural to wonder about the relationship between 
Sally’s partial and comparative beliefs. It’s clear enough they’re closely related: if 
Sally is x% confident that P and y% confident that Q, then she’s more confident that 
P than she is that Q just in case x > y ; and in the other direction, if Sally just as 
confident that P as she is that Q, then she’s x% confident that P just in case she’s x% 
confident that Q. Moreover, these conditionals have a certain feel of apriority about 
them, so it’s reasonable to think they’re underwritten by some interesting conceptual 
or metaphysical connection.
According to comparativism, the facts about Sally’s partial beliefs supervene 
on, and indeed hold in virtue of, the facts about her comparative beliefs.1 Compar-
ativism comes in a range of shapes and sizes, with roots going back to the writ-
ings of Keynes (1921) and de Finetti (1931). Works favourable to comparativism 
include (Koopman 1940; Savage 1954; Fine 1973; Stefánsson 2017, 2018; DiBella 
2018). Closely related ideas have also been defended in Joyce (2010, (2015), and 
Hawthorne (2016). We’ll talk more about the details in a moment; but the general 
thought is that an agent like Sally’s system of partial beliefs can be reduced to a 
ranking of propositions by their relative confidence, with numerical strengths of 
belief thus serving as a ‘theoretical tool’ for representing the positions of proposi-
tions within that ranking.
In Sect. 3, I’ll argue that comparativism presently lacks any adequate account of 
the measurement of the strengths of our beliefs. Objections and responses to my 
arguments will be considered in Sects. 4 and Sect. 5, I will consider the related idea 
that the facts about partial beliefs are determined by the facts about comparative 
beliefs plus some further qualitative mental state (e.g. preferences, or qualitative 
judgements about evidential relationships). But before we discuss any problems 
with comparativism, we should get a clearer idea of what comparativism is.
2  Probabilistic Comparativism
There are two essential components to any comparativist’s theory. The first, to put it 
roughly, is an explanation of where the numbers come from. As B.O. Koopman once 
expressed the idea,
... all the axiomatic treatments of intuitive probability current in the literature 
take as their starting point a number (usually between 0 and 1) corresponding 
to the ‘degree of rational belief’ or ‘credibility’ of the eventuality in question. 
Now we hold that such a number is in no wise a self-evident concomitant with 
or expression of the primordial intuition of probability, but rather a mathemati-
cal construct derived from [comparative beliefs] under very special condi-
tions... (1940, p. 269)
1 To emphasise: comparativism, as I’m understanding it, is not the idea that partial beliefs depend on 
some comparative thing or other. Comparativism is a specific thesis about the relationship between par-
tial and comparative beliefs. Comparativism can be—and often is—divorced from the much more gen-
eral thesis that beliefs depend on something comparative (e.g., preferences).
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The second component is an explanation of where cardinality comes from. The 
numbers we use to represent the strengths of belief seem to encode more-than-
merely-ordinal (read: cardinal) information, and this requires explanation. Why, for 
instance, does it seem to make sense to say such things as Sally believes P much 
more than Q, or twice as much as Q, or a fraction as much as Q?
In Sect.  2.1, I’ll say more about the first component; in Sects. 2.2–2.3, more 
about the second. I note, though, that I will not try to describe every possible variety 
of comparativism on the market. Instead, I’ll focus my exposition on a relatively 
straightforward and especially common version, probabilistic comparativism.
2.1  Where the Numbers Come From
I like to think that Sally accepts probabilism, as well she should. Supposing that 
she does, what is it then that she accepts? Well, according to the usual gloss, proba-
bilism says that her beliefs ought to conform to the axioms of the probability cal-
culus. But that can’t be quite right: the axioms of the probability calculus are con-
straints on real-valued functions, and whatever Sally’s beliefs might be, they aren’t 
literally functions between propositions and real numbers.
Of course, there’s no real problem here—not yet, anyway. The usual gloss on 
probabilism was only meant to be elliptical. The intention all along was that Sally’s 
beliefs ought to be such that they’re representable by a probability function. But 
now what does that mean?
We can break the claim down into two parts. The first is a constraint on the set of 
propositions (call it  ) regarding which Sally has beliefs—specifically, that it should 
have a ‘Boolean’ structure. A nice and general way to describe that structure is to 
suppose that propositions are (or can be modelled by) sets of possible worlds.2 If we 
let Ω henceforth denote an appropriately chosen set of such worlds, then probabilists 
will typically require: 
Boolean.   is non-empty, and if P and Q are in  , then Ω ⧵ P (henceforth: ¬P ), 
P ∪ Q , and P ∩ Q are also in 
The second (and more interesting) part is a constraint on the beliefs themselves. 
Specifically, Sally’s beliefs ought to be such as can be represented by a function 
pr ∶  ↦ ℝ satisfying: 
normalisation.  pr(Ω) = 1
non-negativity.  pr(P) ≥ 0
additivity.  If P ∩ Q = ∅ , then pr(P ∪ Q) = pr(P) + pr(Q)
2 By ‘possible worlds’, I mean nothing more nor less than that the worlds are complete and closed under 
classical logic. I prefer to think of Ω as a set of ‘scenarios’ in the sense of Chalmers (2011), so  ∈ Ω 
whenever  cannot be ruled out apriori. You might prefer to model propositions using possible and 
impossible worlds, sentences in some formal language, or something else entirely. Some of my critical 
arguments will depend on how Ω is understood, so I’ll have more to say about this in Sect. 4.1.
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 So what would Sally’s beliefs have to be like, exactly, to be probabilistically 
representable?
Comparativism offers an answer. It’s not the only possible answer, but it’s 
not an intrinsically implausible one either, and historically it has been extremely 
influential. The comparativist says that Sally’s partial beliefs are nothing over and 
above her comparative beliefs. Consequently, a probability function represents 
Sally’s beliefs just when the ordering of the numerical values assigned to the 
propositions she believes corresponds exactly to the ordering induced over those 
propositions by her comparative beliefs.
Assume henceforth that  is Boolean, and assume furthermore that Sally’s full 
suite of comparative beliefs can be represented with a single binary relation ≿ 
defined over  , where
and where ≻ and ∼ stand for the more confident and equally confident comparatives 
respectively,
We’ll refer to ≿ as Sally’s confidence ranking. Given this, say that a real-valued 
function f (not necessarily a probability function) agrees with ≿ just in case
Thus, if we suppose that Sally’s beliefs reduce to her comparative beliefs, the notion 
of agreement provides us with an unambiguous sense in which those beliefs can 
be represented by a probability function. It also gives clear meaning to Koopman’s 
assertion above that the numbers used to represent strengths of belief are just ‘math-
ematical constructs’ designed to help us reason about what, according to compara-
tivism, is ultimately a system of purely ordinal judgements of relative confidence.
Supposing we accept all this, then an important benefit is that we’re able to 
supply an alternative and unambiguous formulation of exactly what it is that 
probabilism requires. Since (de Finetti 1931), we’ve known that probabilistic 
agreement requires Sally’s confidence ranking to satisfy (for all P,Q,R ∈  ): 
Weak order.  ≿ is transitive and complete
non-triviality.  Ω ≻ ∅
minimality.  P ≿ ∅
monotonicity.  If R ∩ (P ∪ Q) = ∅ , then P ≿ Q iff (P ∪ R) ≿ (Q ∪ R)
 We need something a little stronger than monotonicity if we want necessary and 
sufficient conditions for probabilistic agreement (Kraft et  al. 1959; Scott 1964), 
and we need something even stronger still if we want there to be only one prob-
ability function that agrees with the confidence ranking (see Fishburn 1986). But 
the details of those further (and more complicated) conditions need not concern 
P ≿ Q iff Sally has at least as much confidence in P as in Q,
P ≻ Q iff (P ≿ Q)&¬(Q ≿ P), P ∼ Q iff (P ≿ Q)& (Q ≿ P)
P ≿ Q iff f (P) ≥ f (Q)
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us—what’s listed is more than enough to get a handle on the kind of shape a con-
fidence ranking has to have to be probabilistically representable.3
2.2  Where Cardinality Comes From: The Transformation Argument
Now you might worry that something’s still missing from the picture I’ve just 
described: comparativists still owe us an explanation of where cardinality comes 
from. This is sometimes raised as a special challenge for comparativism (e.g. Mea-
cham and Weisberg 2011, p. 659), and it will be the primary focus of my critical 
discussion in Sect. 3 as well.
Imagine for example that Sally is about to roll an ordinary six-sided die. Now 
consider: 
ordinal.  Sally is more confident of rolling ≥ 2 than of rolling a 1
interval.  Sally is much more confident of rolling ≥ 2 than of rolling a 1
ratio.  Sally is five times as confident of rolling ≥ 2 than of rolling a 1
 To get an initial sense of why one might think there’s a problem here, suppose we 
have a probability function, pr , which agrees with ≿ , such that
So pr also seems to capture the truth of interval and ratio. However, any order-
preserving transformation of pr will also agree with ≿ , and only information that’s 
common to each of these functions—the ordering—can be taken to represent some-
thing doxastically ‘real’. We know that neither ratios nor ratios of intervals need be 
preserved across arbitrary order-preserving transformations. Therefore, it seems, 
only claims like ordinal can have genuine doxastic meaning, whereas claims like 
interval and ratio seem to depend on an arbitrary choice of scale. Call this the 
transformation argument; the upshot is supposed to be that comparativism cannot 
explain how partial beliefs manage to carry cardinal information.
The transformation argument is flawed. Comparativists have long-standing 
explanatory strategy for explaining cardinal information that’s entirely consistent 
with their view, one which is based on standard methodologies for explaining car-
dinality in basic extensive quantities like length and mass. (This explanation can 
be found in numerous locations, though it’s discussed in particular depth in (Fine 
pr(rolling ≥ 2) =
5
6
, pr(rolling 1) =
1
6
3 One particularly important way in which comparativists might diverge from the kind view I’ve been 
describing is worth flagging here. What we might call quarternary comparativism replaces binary 
confidence rankings with a quarternary relation: P,Q ≿ R, S iff Sally has at least as much confidence 
in P given R as she does in R given S. Conditions similar to Weak order, non-triviality, etc., are 
then used to ensure that conditional probabilities agree with ≿ , in the sense that P,Q ≿ R, S iff 
pr(P |Q) ≥ pr(R | S) . See, e.g., (Koopman 1940), (Fine 1973, pp. 28–32), (DiBella 2018). Each of the 
main explanatory and critical points that I discuss below with regards to binary comparativism apply also 
to quarternary comparativism, mutatis mutandis. To keep the discussion to a reasonable length, however, 
I won’t be able to spell out the details.
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1973, pp. 68ff.) So, in the remainder of this section I’ll first explain why the trans-
formation argument is flawed by showing why a parallel argument fails in the case 
of length; following that I’ll describe the standard ‘probabilistic comparativist’ 
explanation of cardinality.
We’ll focus on characterising ratios of lengths, since once those are defined it’s 
straightforward to define ratios of intervals of lengths. Hence, consider ‘  is five 
times longer than  ’. Our task is to provide truth conditions for this sentence without 
presupposing any cardinal information. Towards that end, suppose we have at hand 
five further objects, 1–5 , each of which is exactly as long as  , and which share no 
parts with one another. You might refer to these as  ’s length-duplicates. Glossing 
over a few complications, it’s plausible enough to say that ‘  is five times longer 
than  ’ would be true if, and only if, were you to take these five length-duplicates of 
 and lay them end-to-end, then the result would be as long as :
This suggests that it’s possible to give at least rough-and-ready truth conditions 
for a claim about ratios of lengths in purely relational terms: ‘  is five times longer 
than  ’ just means  is as long as 5 disjoint length-duplicates of  laid end-to-end. 
Note, in particular, that the truth conditions say nothing whatsoever about how 
lengths are numerically represented.
That’s the basic idea, and simple variations on the same strategy can be used to 
provide truth conditions for any other rational ratio comparison as well. (For exam-
ple, what we’ve said already entails that 1 and 2 laid end-to-end will be 
2
5
 as long as 
 , and 2
3
 as long as 3 , 4 , and 5 laid end-to-end.) With a bit of mathematical trickery 
we can extend the strategy to provide truth conditions for irrational ratio compari-
sons as well.
But regardless of whether we generalise it to all real ratio comparisons or just 
stick with rational ratios, we’ll need to make two general assumptions. The first is 
existential: if we’re going to fix a length ratio between any pair of objects, then the 
strategy requires that there are always enough length-duplicates of the appropriate 
length lying about that we can lay end-to-end. That’s the rough version; we don’t 
need to worry too much about what the precise version looks like for this discussion. 
What matters, simply, is that the more length ratios you want to characterise, the 
more objects of varying lengths you’re going to need. And that’s reasonable enough, 
given there’s quite a few objects in the universe for us to play with. The second 
assumption concerns the structure of the ordinal length relations themselves, and 
how those relations interact with the physical operation of laying objects end-to-end. 
In short: the is at least as long as relation should behave like ≥ , and the laid end-to-
end operation should relate to the is at least as long as relation in the same way + 
relates to ≥.
We can state this requirement more exactly. Let ≿⋆ designate the is at least as 
long as relation, with ∼⋆ and ≻⋆ defined in the usual way. Then, let 𝛼 ⊕ 𝛽 designate 
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some object that’s as long as two disjoint 1 , 2 laid end-to-end, where 𝛾1 ∼⋆ 𝛼 and 
𝛾2 ∼
⋆ 𝛽 . Furthermore, say that  has zero length just in case for all  , 𝛼 ⊕ 𝛽 ∼⋆ 𝛽 . 
Then, we need that for all  ,  , ,4
Weak order.  ≿⋆ is transitive and complete
Positivity.  𝛼 ⊕ 𝛽 ≻⋆ 𝛼 whenever  has non-zero length
Weak commutativity.  (𝛼 ⊕ 𝛽) ∼⋆ (𝛽 ⊕ 𝛼)
Weak associativity.  𝛼 ⊕ (𝛽 ⊕ 𝛾) ∼⋆ (𝛼 ⊕ 𝛽)⊕ 𝛾
monotonicity.  𝛼 ≿⋆ 𝛽 iff 𝛼 ⊕ 𝛾 ≿⋆ 𝛽 ⊕ 𝛾
archimedean.  Nothing is infinitely longer than anything else
Each of these conditions is plausible, and one of the key results in the theory of 
measurement is that if they’re all satisfied, and the appropriate existential condition 
is also satisfied, then there’s a way f of assigning real numbers to objects such that 
for all such objects ,  , 
1. f () ≥ 0
2. f (𝛼) ≥ f (𝛽) iff 𝛼 ≿⋆ 𝛽
3. f (𝛼 ⊕ 𝛽) = f (𝛼) + f (𝛽)
Call any f satisfying these three properties an additive measure of ≿⋆.
Now it’s important to be clear how the existence of an additive measure relates to 
the transformation argument. It’s well known that additive measures are unique up 
to positive similarity transformations—that is, if f is an additive measure then so too 
is f⋆ just in case
And it’s also well known that positive similarity transformations preserve 
ratios. Consequently, if length is measured using any additive measure f, then 
f () = n ⋅ f () just in case  is as long as n of  ’s length-duplicates laid end-to-end. 
But none of these facts yet explain why ‘  is n times longer than  ’ has genuine real-
world meaning, simply because there’s nothing about the nature of length itself that 
forces the use of an additive measure (cf. Krantz et al. 1971, pp. 11–12, 99ff; Luce 
and Narens 1984).
For concreteness, where  is the set of objects, say that f is an accurate measure 
of the length relation ≿⋆ just in case it maps  onto some ℝ⋆ ⊆ ℝ such that ≿⋆ is 
represented by ≥ and ⊕ is represented by some operation ◦ ∶ (ℝ⋆ ×ℝ⋆) ↦ ℝ⋆ . The 
additive measures are then a special class of the accurate measures—those in which 
 is mapped onto a (subset of) the non-negative reals ℝ≥0 and ⊕ is represented with 
+ . But there’s an infinite variety of equally accurate non-additive measures that we 
f⋆(𝛼) = r ⋅ f (𝛼), r > 0
4 The archimedean condition is here stated informally. See (Krantz et al. 1971, pp. 71ff) for the precise 
version. A statement of the archimedean condition for the additive measurement of confidence rankings 
can be found in (Chateauneuf and Jaffray 1984, p. 193).
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could have chosen to measure length with instead. Consider, for example, a multipli-
cative measure f ′ , whereby: 
1. f �() ≥ 1
2. f �(𝛼) ≥ f �(𝛽) iff 𝛼 ≿⋆ 𝛽
3. f �(𝛼 ⊕ 𝛽) = f �(𝛼) × f �(𝛽)
The two numerical systems ⟨ℝ
≥0,≥,+⟩ and ⟨ℝ≥1,≥,×⟩ are isomorphic to one 
another, so a multiplicative measure will be accurate whenever an additive meas-
ure is. But multiplicative measures are not unique up to positive similarity trans-
formations, and  will be as long as n of  ’s length-duplicates laid end-to-end iff 
f �() = f �()n.
More generally, given that ◦ can be any operation on some ℝ⋆ ⊆ ℝ , every order-
preserving transformation f ′′ of any accurate measure f will itself count as accu-
rate relative to some ℝ⋆ and ◦ . In the vast majority of these cases the operation ◦ 
will seem ‘unnatural’ by comparison to + or × , and only the most masochistic of us 
would want represent ⊕ using it—but that doesn’t change the fact that we could in 
principle do so if were we so inclined.
There’s no fact of the matter as to which measure f, f ′ , f ′′ , ..., is the correct one to 
use, only a choice borne of convention and convenience. So let’s say that a measure 
is adequate just in case it’s accurate and it represents ⊕ in a convenient way. Addi-
tive measures of length are adequate, but then so too are multiplicative measures 
(albeit slightly less so). The measure f ′′ generated by an arbitrary order-preserving 
transformation of f (or of f ′ ) will in most cases be highly inadequate, though it’ll be 
no less accurate because of this.
So we can now finally say exactly where the transformation argument is going 
wrong. The error lies in thinking that what we’ve been calling ‘ratio information’ 
in our partial beliefs depends in any interesting way on the numbers we use to rep-
resent the strengths of those beliefs. This is a mistake, as the example with length 
shows. There’s nothing stopping us from using an additive measure f or a multiplica-
tive measure f ′ to measure the length relation ≿⋆ , but
That is: there’s no deep connection between what we’ve determined to be the truth 
conditions for claims about ‘ratios’ of lengths and the specific numerical relation-
ships that hold between the numbers assigned by different but equally accurate ways 
of measuring length. We call it ‘ratio information’ because we’re accustomed to 
using additive measures, but had physics developed slightly differently we’d be call-
ing it ‘power information’.
Ultimately, it’s the structure of the underlying system of length relations that 
explains why a claim like ‘  is five times longer than  ’ has real-world meaning. 
And it’s that underlying structure which is established by the existence of an additive 
measure—the fact that additive measures are also unique up to a positive similarity 
transformation is entirely besides the point. By the same token, if comparativism 
is right, then it’s the confidence ranking itself that contains cardinal information if 
f () = n ⋅ f () iff f �() = f �()n
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anything does; how we choose to represent that information numerically is irrele-
vant, and it’s the failure to appreciate this that leads to the erroneous transformation 
argument.
2.3  Where Cardinality Comes From: The SCEC
But comparativism isn’t out of the woods yet! Showing that the same style of expla-
nation of cardinal information can in principle be made to work for comparative 
beliefs requires some heavy duty assumptions about  and ≿ , analogous to the exis-
tential and structural assumptions needed to guarantee the existence of an additive 
measure of length.
Before anything else, it needs to be shown that there’s some operation on propo-
sitions (qua relata of ≿ ) that can serve as an ‘addition’ operation in the same way 
that ⊕ serves as an ‘addition’ operation for length. Now such an operation is easy to 
find, if Sally’s confidence ranking agrees with a probability function—for then the 
restriction of the union operation to disjoint propositions will behave like addition 
with respect to that ranking. This is an immediate consequence of additivity. Con-
sequently, comparativists have typically pointed towards the union of disjoint prop-
ositions as their proposed qualitative analogue of addition (e.g. Fine 1973,  p.  68; 
Krantz et al. 1971, p. 200; Stefánsson 2018; DiBella 2018; though cf. Elliott 2019b, 
Sect. 3.2, for a more general operation).
And indeed, if ≿ agrees with a probability function, then for all disjoint 
P,Q,R ∈  , 
Weak order.  ≿ is transitive and complete
Positivity.  (P ∪ Q) ≻ Q whenever P ≻ ∅
Weak commutativity.  (P ∪ Q) ∼ (Q ∪ P)
Weak associativity.  (P ∪ (Q ∪ R)) ∼ ((P ∪ Q) ∪ R)
monotonicity.  P ≿ Q iff (P ∪ R) ≿ (Q ∪ R)
archimedean.  Sally is not infinitely more confident that P than that Q
So if Sally’s confidence ranking agrees with some probability function pr , then 
‘Sally believes P n times as much as Q’ whenever P ≿ (R1 ∪ … ∪ Rn) , where the 
R1,… ,Rn are disjoint and R1 ∼ … ∼ Rn ∼ Q . Here the R1,… ,Rn are Q’s confi-
dence-duplicates, and it follows that pr(P) = n ⋅ pr(Q) . Hence, ≿ has an ‘additive’ 
structure with respect to the union of disjoint propositions, which can thus be ade-
quately represented using the additive measure pr.
We have arrived at what I’ll call the standard comparativist explanation of car-
dinality, or SCEC. If the SCEC is on the right track, then there’s a close analogy 
between the measurement of partial belief and the measurement of length, and this 
undoubtedly lends some plausibility to the comparativist’s thesis (cf. Fine 1976, 
1973,  pp.  15–16; Stefánsson 2017, 2018). After all, there’s something obviously 
compelling about explaining ratios of strengths of belief using a method that’s con-




But we should be careful not to overstate what the foregoing discussion estab-
lishes. Nothing so far suffices to show that if ≿ agrees with a probability function, 
then Sally has, say, at least twice as much confidence in P as in Q if or only if 
P ≿ (R1 ∪ R2) , where R1 and R2 are disjoint confidence-duplicates of Q. Still less 
have comparativists given us any detailed story on what to say when ≿ doesn’t agree 
with a probability function. Rather, the SCEC is a ‘how possibly’ story—an account 
of how comparativism might explain cardinality given some very strong assump-
tions about the shape of ≿ and its relationship with ∪ . It’s enough to establish that 
comparativism might in principle be able to account for cardinality, at least some-
times, but by no means does it establish that the SCEC is correct.
It is also important to note that there’s more than one way to explain how partial 
beliefs might come to contain meaningful cardinal information. Denying the SCEC 
does not commit one to the manifestly absurd idea that there is no qualitative expla-
nation of where the numbers come from and how they manage to encode cardinal 
information. Other well-established methods for understanding ratio information do 
not follow the SCEC’s pattern—i.e., they do not require theorists to locate some 
operation (like ⊕ or ∪ ) which shares structural characteristics with +.
For example, in additive conjoint measurement (Luce and Tukey 1964; Krantz 
et al. 1971), cardinal information for a given quantity q can be determined by refer-
ence to how that quantity interacts with another quantity q′ to produce an ordering 
≿† with respect to some further quantity q† distinct from either q or q′ . No real-world 
‘addition’ operation is needed here: structural properties of the ≿†-ordering are used 
to establish that intervals and/or ratios have meaning for q (and for q′ ), given back-
ground theoretical assumptions about how q and q′ interact to produce ≿† . Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979) have suggested that conjoint measurement theory can be 
used to simultaneously explain the measurement of both partial beliefs and utilities 
in terms of how they interact to produce preferences over choices, and a representa-
tion theorem which simultaneously builds subjective probabilities and utilities out of 
preferences (e.g., Savage 1954) can help to provide the foundations for such a view.
A distinct but closely related strategy explains the measurement of partial belief 
on the pattern of dimensionless quantities. Unlike conjoint measurement, where the 
cardinal properties of two quantities q and q′ are defined by relation to a third quan-
tity q† , most dimensionless quantities q of interest are defined in terms of ratios of 
differences in a single distinct quantity q′ . Consider Mach numbers. A Mach number 
is not a unit of speed; rather, it’s a ratio that represents the speed of an object travel-
ling through a medium relative to the speed of sound in that medium. If we let s be 
any measure of speed on at least an interval scale, then relative to a given medium 
we can define an object’s Mach number M:
Along these lines, I prefer an approach that originates with Ramsey (1931): beliefs 
are causally tied to preferences in such a way that cardinal information can be 
extracted from their relationship. On a very simplified version of this approach, the 
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has on the utility of a gamble conditional on P relative to that gamble’s best and 
worst outcomes—where u measures the Sally’s preferences measured on an interval 
scale, Sally is indifferent between Q and ⟨ R if P, S otherwise⟩ , and she prefers R to 
S, then
Note that saying this has no implications regarding the relative fundamentality of 
beliefs, utilities, and preferences. The claim is not that the facts about partial beliefs 
are nothing over and above the facts about preferences; nor is the claim that beliefs 
have no other functional roles other than those in relation to preferences. Instead, 
the claim need only be that the meaningfulness of ratios and intervals of strengths 
of belief is explicable by reference to that part of the typical causal role that partial 
beliefs play in relation to preferences.
Comparativists will no doubt have objections to these alternatives. I’ve defended 
both in other works, and I’m not going to do it again here (see Elliott 2017, 2019b). 
The present point is just that an explanation of ratios of strengths of beliefs need 
not be based on the model of the measurement of length at all. Comparativists don’t 
have a monopoly on scientifically respectable explanations of cardinal information!
3  The Case Against the SCEC
The overarching goal for the following discussion will be to show that the SCEC 
isn’t quite as illuminating as we might have hoped. Broadly speaking, I’ll argue for 
this in two ways.
First, there appear to be conceptually possible and theoretically-relevant distinct 
states of partial belief, with corresponding and apparently meaningful differences 
in cardinal information, which correspond to the very same probabilistically repre-
sentable confidence ranking (Sects. 3.1–3.4). Hence, the SCEC cannot explain the 
differences in cardinal information. More generally, these arguments suggest that 
comparative beliefs do not suffice to determine the facts about partial beliefs, which 
alone rules out any strict version of comparativism.
Second, there appear to be conceptually possible and theoretically-relevant dis-
tinct states of partial belief that correspond to no probabilistically representable con-
fidence ranking whatsoever (Sect. 3.5). So, again, the SCEC cannot explain the car-
dinal information present in those systems of belief.
3.1  The SCEC and Almost Omniscience
Suppose that Sally is almost omniscient:
Example 1 Sally is ideally rational, and her comparative beliefs satisfy all the 
requirements for agreement with a probability function. Furthermore, she is almost 






to exactly two possibilities: 1 and 2 . While Sally’s got some confidence in each, 
she’s much more confident that the actual world is 1 than that it’s 2.
The notion of almost omniscience should make sense; in fact, a minor vari-
ation on it already exists in the literature in the case of David Lewis’ two gods 
(1979,  pp.  520–1). And we could easily imagine each one of Lewis’ gods being 
more or less confident regarding which of the two (centred) worlds they inhabit 
by some substantial amount, even if the exact amount is itself imprecise to some 
degree. (The point here won’t hinge on whether the strengths of belief are precise.) 
So I take it that the situation described is conceivable.
However, the SCEC cannot explain how an almost omniscient Sally might be 
much more confident that the actual world is 1 than that it’s 2 . A probability func-
tion pr will agree with ≿ if and only if, for all P in ,
Now the problem here is not that there are some probability functions satisfying this 
condition where the different between x and y is large (arbitrarily close to 1), and 
some where the difference is small (arbitrarily close to 0). Either type of probability 
function would agree with Sally’s confidence ranking, so they’re just as accurate as 
one another. But the numbers are irrelevant. The reason the SCEC cannot give us 
any explanation of cardinality in this case is that one of the key background assump-
tions isn’t satisfied.
Recall that explaining cardinal information in the case of length requires an 
important existential assumption—roughly, that there are enough length-duplicates 
of objects of varying lengths for us to ‘add’ together. The analogous requirement 
is not satisfied in Example 1: for any P such that 1 ∈ P or 2 ∈ P , there are no 
appropriate ‘confidence-duplicates’ of P—and so there’s not enough propositions 
around to ‘add’. And yet it certainly seems conceivable that Sally could be almost 
omniscient and believe one proposition much more than another. It’s not like, by vir-
tue of knowing almost everything there is to know, Sally loses the ability to believe 
one thing much more than another.
So if the situation described in Example 1 is conceivable, then we’ve found an 
initial intuitive problem for comparativism. Just imagine that Sally has a friend Bob 
with the same confidence ranking, but who’s only a little more confident that the 
actual world is 1 than that it’s 2 . Since it’s conceptually possible for Sally and Bob 
to have the very same confidence ranking but distinct doxastic states, it follows that 
there might be more to an agent’s beliefs than their comparative beliefs. Moreover, 
the missing information is cardinal information, which due to the lack of appropriate 
‘confidence-duplicates’ in  cannot be explained by the SCEC.
There’s a few ways one might respond to this example. One might agree that the 
described situation is possible, and that the facts about comparative beliefs alone 







0, if neither 𝜔1 nor 𝜔2 are in P,
x, if 𝜔1 is in p, but 𝜔2 is not in P,
y, if 𝜔2 is in p, but 𝜔1 is not in P,
1, if both 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 are in P,
where 1 > x > 0.5 > y > 0
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to a weaker view according to which the facts about Sally’s partial beliefs hold in 
virtue of the facts about her comparative beliefs plus some further qualitative phe-
nomenon. I’ll come back to this idea in Sect. 5, since it’s an important response to 
several of the following examples as well. Until then, we focus on the stricter ver-
sion of comparativism.
Another obvious response would be to deny that there’s any strong link between 
conceivability and possibility. Comparativism is a supervenience thesis, and if con-
ceivability doesn’t entail possibility (at least in this case) then there’s simply no 
problem to worry about. Well, if that’s the route you want to take, then so be it—
here’s not the place to decide fundamental questions of philosophical methodology, 
and I’ll leave it for comparativists to provide well-motivated reasons to reject any 
conceivability-possibility link here.
There is a third response, however, which I think is more interesting: perhaps the 
intuitive sense that there is cardinal information in this case lacks an appropriate 
theoretical foundation, and for that reason might be rightly ignored. As Fine notes,
... from the viewpoint of the theory of measurement it is only reasonable to 
insist upon an additive scale (probability) for uncertainty if this numerical 
relationship [i.e. pr(P ∪ Q) = pr(P) + pr(Q) for disjoint P and Q] reflects an 
underlying empirical relationship between uncertainties. (1973, p. 24)
That is: claims relating to the presence of cardinal information in our degrees of 
belief need to be founded appropriately in theory, and according to comparativism 
that foundation just is the structure of an agent’s confidence ranking. Without an 
appropriate theoretical foundation, who’s to say that any intuitions we have regard-
ing this and similar examples aren’t just an illusion brought about by a lack of 
awareness regarding how probability functions actually serve to measure strengths 
of belief—similar to how some people might mistakenly think it makes sense to say 
that if it’s 30 °C during the day and 15 °C in the evening, then it’s twice as hot dur-
ing the day as it is in the evening.
This is an important response, and I suspect it’s one that many comparativists 
will reach for. To provide evidence that any anti-comparativist intuitions regarding 
Example 1 aren’t a mere illusion, then, we need a theoretical justification for posit-
ing more structure than can be captured by a confidence ranking.
3.2  The SCEC and Decision Theory
Towards that end, consider the following example. Say that a non-empty proposi-
tion P is an atom for Sally just in case she has no beliefs regarding any non-empty 
propositions stronger than P. Furthermore, say that  is atomic just in case every 
non-empty proposition in  is identical to the union of some collection of atoms. 
Now consider:
Example 2 At t1 , Sally has probabilistically representable beliefs with respect 
to an atomic algebra  , with atoms A1,A2,A3 . Her confidence ranking includes 
(A1 ∪ A2) ∼ A3 ≻ A2 ≻ A1 . Furthermore, Sally has more than twice as much 
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confidence in A2 as in A1 . At t2 , she changes her beliefs slightly: while her compara-
tive beliefs remain the same as they were at t1 , she’s now just a little more confident 
regarding A2 than she is regarding A1.
Sally’s situation should again be conceivable. In pictorial form, where the size 
of the boxes represent the relevant strengths of belief,
The probabilistic comparativists cannot agree that Sally’s beliefs have changed; 
instead, they have to say that what seems here like a conceivable difference between 
Sally at t1 and at t2 is in fact impossible. But we can go beyond mere conceivability 
intuitions in this case, since we can have theoretically well-motivated reasons for 
saying that Sally attaches more confidence to A1 at t1 than she does at t2.
A probability pr agrees with Sally’s confidence ranking at either time iff
There’s no shortage of probability functions satisfying this condition, and each pre-
dicts a different set of preferences when it’s (1) taken to model a possible belief 
state, and (2) combined with any standard model of rational preference formation, 
e.g. orthodox expected utility theory.
Suppose for instance that at both t1 and t2 , Sally faces choices which have the 







Option  −2x x x
Option  0 0 x
Now imagine that at t1 Sally strictly chooses  ; and at t2 she makes the oppo-
site choice. The expected utility of  is greater than the expected utility of  just 
in case pr(A2) >
1
3
 , so a natural explanation for the change is that at t1 Sally has 
more than twice the confidence in A2 as she does in A1 , while at t2 she doesn’t. 
More generally, we could easily imagine that Sally’s dispositions to choose 
regarding an infinite range of possible choice situations consistently point towards 
her believing A2 more than twice as much as A1 at t1 , and less than twice as much 
at t2 . Sally prefers  to  at t1 , and  to  at t2 : 
pr(A1) + pr(A2) = pr(A3) = 0.5 > pr(A2) > 0.25 > pr(A1) > 0
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Option  2x −x x
Option  0 0 x
There’s a natural explanation for why Sally would have dispositions ‘as if’ she 
believed A2 more than twice as much as A1 at t1 and less than twice as much at t2—
because she does indeed believe A2 more than twice as much as A1 at t1 and less than 
twice as much at t2 . That explanation is off-limits to comparativism.
The point of all this is that not only is there a conceivable cardinal difference 
between Sally’s beliefs at t1 and t2 , but that such differences can do useful theoreti-
cal work. If Sally has more than twice the confidence in A2 as she does in A1 , then 
the utilities of the outcomes at A2 get more than twice the weighting as the utilities 
of the outcomes at A1—and since the difference in utility between x and 0 is half 
the difference between 0 and −2x , the cardinal differences in the weightings for A1 
and A2 between t1 and t2 makes a difference to her preferences. There’s a theoreti-
cal foundation for the intuition that Sally’s beliefs changed from t1 to t2 , despite no 
change in her comparative beliefs.
Cardinal differences between ordinally-equivalent systems of partial belief can 
show up in how those beliefs interact with utilities in the generation of preferences 
according to the standard theory of decision making. Those differences cannot be 
explained by reference to Sally’s comparative beliefs with respect to unions of dis-
joint equally-ranked propositions. Indeed, the SCEC in principle cannot help us 
explain any cardinal relationships between the strengths of her beliefs for A1 and A2 
(at either time), since again the required ‘confidence-duplicates’ are missing. So, in 
at least some cases, the SCEC fails to adequately recapture one of the key theoretical 
reasons for supposing that our beliefs carry cardinal information.5
3.3  The SCEC and Radical Pyrrhonianism
Is the SCEC at least still successful in those special cases where there’s no short-
age of ‘confidence-duplicates’, and subsequently the confidence ranking agrees with 
exactly one probability function? Well, no—I don’t think so. Consider:
Example 3 Although her confidence ranking agrees with exactly one probability 
function, Sally is not an ideal Bayesian agent. After reading a little too much radical 
Pyrrhonian literature, she insists it’s never rational to be fully certain of anything: 
5 Let me reiterate that while Example 1 and Example 2 are intended as problems specifically for binary 
probabilistic comparativism, analogous cases can be raised for quarternary probabilistic comparativism 
as well. The examples are only meant to be illustrative of a general issue. The core of the problem is 
that relative to any algebra of propositions there are always some—indeed, many—binary/quarternary ≿ 
that agree with multiple unconditional/conditional pr. This occurs when there are too few ‘confidence-
duplicates’ to determine ratios for all pairs of propositions. And as a general rule of thumb, the numerical 




one should always reserve some slight doubt (say, 1%) that even the most firm of 
logical truths might be false, and that any logical falsehood might be true. Moreover, 
her preferences consistently reflect her new-found commitments—for instance, she’d 
prefer being given $90 outright to the gamble ⟨$100 if P ∨ ¬P , −$1000 otherwise⟩ , 
and she prefers ⟨$100 if P ∨ ¬P , $100, 000 otherwise⟩ to being given $1000 outright.
Here’s one explanation of Sally’s preferences: where pr is the unique probability 
function that agrees with Sally’s confidence ranking, her partial beliefs are in fact 
modelled by the non-additive pyr , where
Think of pyr as pr squished down by 1% on either side. How would this help to 
explain Sally’s preferences? Because those preferences make sense given pyr.6 We 
may want to say that Sally is epistemically irrational, since she fails to attach com-
plete certainty to self-evident tautologies. But she is at least pragmatically rational 
enough to choose appropriately given her slightly misled beliefs.
Such an explanation is off-limits for comparativism: pr and pyr are ordinally 
equivalent, so comparativists are committed to saying that pr represents Sally’s 
beliefs iff pyr does. They might say that at most one of pr and pyr constitutes an 
adequate representation of her beliefs, but both must be accurate. And any agent 
with beliefs accurately represented by the probability function pr ought to prefer 
⟨$100 if P ∨ ¬P , −$1000 otherwise⟩ to being given $90 outright, and prefer $1000 
outright to ⟨$100 if P ∨ ¬P , $100, 000 otherwise⟩ . Consequently, Sally must—for 
some reason—have chosen irrationally given her beliefs. But that’s hardly satisfy-
ing. We have to posit some irrationality somewhere in order to explain Sally’s pref-
erences. If there’s a doxastically relevant difference between pr and pyr , then the 
former explanation leaves us with an agent that makes sense: it’s easy to imagine an 
agent so committed to radical Pyrrhonianism that they doubt even the most obvi-
ous logical truths. The latter explanation, on the other hand, leaves us with an agent 
whose preferences are bafflingly nonsensical given what she supposedly believes.
I should note that my argument here does not fall foul of the error discussed by 
Joyce (2015, pp. 418–9) in his defence against a closely related objection to com-
parativism—the error of re-scaling our model of Sally’s beliefs without making 
adjustments to how expected utilities are calculated, thus giving the misleading 
impression that pyr generates different predictions about Sally’s preferences when 
they’re plugged into the standard decision-theoretic model. I agree this would be an 
error—it would be an instance of the very same error underlying the transformation 
argument. We can all agree that the scale we use to measure belief is a matter of 
stipulation. It doesn’t really matter if we represent Sally’s partial beliefs on a 0-to-1 
pyr(P) = 0.98 × pr(P) + 0.01
6 Orthodox expected utility theory presupposes probabilistic coherence. Consequently, in order to 
explain the sense in which Sally’s preferences ‘make sense’ given pyr , we need to go beyond the ortho-
doxy. In Elliott (2017), I describe what Sally’s preferences would need to be like to ‘make sense’ given 
an incoherent function like pyr under a generalisation of expected utility theory that requires only that 
the strengths of belief assigned to complementary propositions sum to 1. See also (Pruss 2020).
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scale, a 0.01-to-0.99 scale, or a 
√
2-to- scale. Likewise it doesn’t really matter if we 
represent Sally’s partial beliefs using an additive scale or a multiplicative scale (and 
so on), so long as we make the appropriate adjustments elsewhere in our theories to 
accommodate those changes.
However, we get to say that pyr is a mere ‘re-scaling’ of pr only under the sub-
stantive assumption that whatever Sally believes least (most) of all, she believes 
to the least (greatest) extent possible. This kind of assumption is required for the 
SCEC’s construction of ratio information: since P ∪ ∅ = P for all P, ∅ needs 
to be treated as the identity element on any additive representation of belief (i.e. 
pr(∅) = 0 ). Yet it’s not a mere matter of stipulation that having at most as much 
confidence in P as in anything else is the same doxastic state as being 0% confident 
that P, since—as Example 3 suggests—it’s not obvious that P’s sitting at the bottom 
of Sally’s confidence ranking plays the same functional or theoretical roles that 0% 
confidence is supposed to play. These are substantive claims, and they need to be 
established by argument.
3.4  The SCEC and Non‑additive Beliefs
Perhaps the foregoing examples are too far-fetched. Not to worry: whenever ≿ agrees 
with a probability function pr , there’s any number of order-preserving transforma-
tions of pr with values in the 0-to-1 range inclusive, and it would be implausible for 
comparativists to claim that there’s no theoretical basis for treating at least some of 
these as representing distinct doxastic states as pr.
Consider the following non-additive order-preserving transformation of the prob-
ability function pr:
cap is a capacity. Specifically, a capacity like cap satisfies the usual normalisa-
tion and non-negativity conditions that any probability function must satisfy, but 
replaces the additivity condition with the weaker:
Every probability function agrees with a confidence ranking, and every such confi-
dence ranking agrees with numerous non-probabilistic capacities. And, importantly, 
these ordinally-equivalent representations of belief will each predict different pat-
terns of preference on any of a range of natural generalisations of ordinary expected 
utility theory which make room for partial beliefs represented by capacities—e.g. 
(Schmeidler 1989; Sarin and Wakker 1992; Elliott 2017), or (Pruss forthcoming).
Thus, suppose that Sally’s confidence ranking agrees with exactly one probability 
















, whenever 1 ≥ pr(P) > 0.5
pr(P) otherwise
If P ⊆ Q, then cap(P) ≤ cap(Q)
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(P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3) ∼ Ω . According to the SCEC, Sally will have half as much confi-
dence in P1 as she does in P2 ∪ P3 , as represented by pr:
In this sense, pr represents the ‘additive’ structure of ≿ in relation to the union of 
disjoint propositions. But we could easily imagine preferences over appropriately 
structured choice situations which suggest that Sally has only 1
3
 as much confidence 
in P1 as she does in P2 ∪ P3 , as captured by cap:
In this case, it’s the non-additive cap that does a better job of capturing the cardinal 
information implicit in how her beliefs relate to her preferences. The fact that ≿ has 
an ‘additive’ structure doesn’t entail that the best representation of Sally’s beliefs is 
a function that satisfies additivity.
3.5  The SCEC and Irrational Rankings
Most capacities do not agree with any ≿ that agrees with a probability function, but 
nevertheless seem to do a perfectly good job of representing possible belief states. 
In particular, there are many capacities that agree with a confidence ranking that 
does not satisfy the monotonicity condition that the SCEC crucially relies upon. 
For instance:
Example 4 Relative to Sally’s comparative beliefs, P1,… ,P100 and 
Q1,… ,Q101 are two sequences of pairwise disjoint propositions, where 
P1 ∼ … ,∼ P100 ∼ Q1 ∼ … ,∼ Q101 . However, due to an accounting error, Sally 
has as much confidence in P1 ∪… ∪ P100 as in R, and as much confidence in R as 
in Q1 ∪… ∪ Q101 . Moreover, her preferences fit with what we’d expect if Sally has 
beliefs represented by the capacity irr , which is additive with respect to the Pi but 
sub-additive by 100
101
% for significantly large unions of the Qi.
A confidence ranking like this is no doubt conceptually possible. However, it’s 
easy to see that the union of disjoint propositions cannot behave like doxastic ana-
logue of addition for any confidence ranking that agrees with irr . For suppose that 
it did. Then Sally would believe R 100 times as much as P1 , and she would believe 
R 101 times as much as Q1 . But she also believes P1 as much as she believes Q1 , and 
she obviously doesn’t believe R 1% more than itself. Hence, ≿ doesn’t have the right 
structure for the SCEC to apply.
Should this mean that Sally doesn’t have partial beliefs with respect to the Pi and 
Qi , or that those partial beliefs don’t carry any determinate and meaningful cardinal 
information? Why should we say that, when we can plug the capacity irr into any 
decision model that makes room for non-additive capacities and have the determi-
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And if that information is meaningful, then its being so cannot be explained by the 
SCEC.
The more general challenge here, of course, is for comparativism to plausibly 
explain cardinal information in the face of ordinary human irrationality. There is a 
substantial amount of work which suggests that ordinary agents’ comparative beliefs 
are not probabilistically representable, and that they’ll often fail to satisfy the mono-
tonicity condition. There are many examples to draw from, but one of the most 
striking—and robust—is the conjunction fallacy:7
P.  Linda is a bank teller
Q.  Linda is active in the feminist movement
P ∩ Q.  Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement
 A large proportion of people—the exact percentage doesn’t matter—when they are 
asked to judge the relative probabilities of these propositions, seem to commit the 
single conjunction fallacy: they will say that they judge P ∩ Q to be more probable 
than one of the other propositions (usually P).
The propositions P and Q in this example are not disjoint, but it doesn’t take 
much work to show that instances of the conjunction fallacy run up against the gen-
eral proposal that the confidence Sally has in the union of disjoint propositions will 
be the sum of the confidences she has for those propositions individually. For in this 
case, P = (P ∩ Q) ∪ (P ∩ ¬Q) , and (P ∩ Q) ∩ (P ∩ ¬Q) = ∅ . Hence, for the anal-
ogy with the measurement of length to hold, we would need:
However, (P ∩ Q) ≻ P , so if pr agrees with ≿ , then pr(P ∩ Q) > pr(P)—which 
would require that pr(P ∩ ¬Q) < 0 , a nonsensical assignment on anyone’s view.
So we have good evidence that ordinary agents’ confidence rankings sometimes 
falsify monotonicity, and consequently don’t have the appropriate structure to sup-
port the measurement analogy. Yet this surely doesn’t prevent such agents from hav-
ing beliefs with meaningful cardinal information. A person who falls foul of the con-
junction fallacy might still, for example, be a little more confident that P ∩ Q than 
that P; while another might be much more confident that P ∩ Q than that P. I take 
it that this is intuitively obvious—or, at least, that if we’re going to say otherwise, 
pr(P) = P
(
(P ∩ Q) ∪ (P ∩ ¬Q)
)
= pr(P ∩ Q) + pr(P ∩ ¬Q)
7 See Lu (2016) for a recent review of the empirical literature, and Moro (2009) for discussion on the 
interpretation of the results. I am aware that the philosophical and psychological literature on the extent 
of human doxastic irrationality is both vast and for the most part controversial, and the cited works cover 
only a tiny fraction of it. Some philosophers might want to argue that the confidence rankings of ordi-
nary agents really are probabilistically representable, all the time. I cannot plausibly cover the relevant 
interpretive and empirical issues here, but I will note that there’s widespread agreement that we’re not 
probabilistically coherent, both with respect to our partial beliefs and (mutatis mutandis) our compara-
tive beliefs. Even most ‘descriptive’ Bayesians will usually agree with this much (e.g. Chater et al. 2011; 
Griffiths et al. 2012)—to the extent that there’s disagreement on this front, it usually concerns the extent 
of our irrationality, not whether we are irrational to some degree. If saving comparativism requires posit-
ing probabilistic coherence for all agents, then that’s about as close to a reductio of the view as it gets.
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then compelling reasons would be required. The people who commit the conjunc-
tion fallacy don’t suddenly lose their capacity to believe the relevant propositions 
with meaningful cardinal differences in strength. Just ask them to bet on P and on 
P ∩ Q , and see those differences at work.
4  Objections and Replies
I’ve discussed the limits of the SCEC when the requisite structural assumptions are 
satisfied but the existential assumptions are not (Sects. 3.1–3.2); when the existential 
and structural conditions are both satisfied (Sects. 3.3–3.4); and when the structural 
conditions are not satisfied (Sect. 3.5). In some of these cases the SCEC fails to sup-
ply any meaningful cardinal information at all, while in others it supplies the wrong 
cardinal information.
So it seems that comparativism still lacks an adequate response to the cardinal-
ity challenge after all. The reason, I think, is that cardinal information just isn’t 
grounded in the structure of ≿ in relation to the union of disjoint propositions, as 
proposed by the SCEC. The analogy with the measurement of length is mislead-
ing. Partial beliefs are more than just a ‘mathematical construct’ for representing 
comparative beliefs, and cardinal information is better explained by reference to the 
functional role partial beliefs play in relation to preferences.
In this section, I’ll consider some potential objections and responses to the argu-
ments of the previous section. Following that, I’ll discuss the view according to 
which the facts about partial belief supervene on the facts about comparative beliefs 
plus some other qualitative phenomenon.
4.1  Impossible Worlds
My argument in Sect. 3.5, that the conjunction fallacy is inconsistent with any con-
fidence ranking that supports the analogy with the measurement of length, relies on 
the assumption that Ω is a set of logically possible worlds. This assumption is used 
to guarantee that (P ∩ Q) ∩ (P ∩ ¬Q) = ∅ and P = (P ∩ Q) ∪ (P ∩ ¬Q).
However, if Ω were to include enough impossible worlds of the right kind, then 
the argument would be invalid. More generally, we know that any apparently non-
probabilistic (complete) confidence ranking with respect to propositions drawn from 
one set of worlds Ω can always be re-expressed as a probabilistically representable 
confidence ranking where the probability function in question is defined for proposi-
tions drawn from a larger space of worlds, Ω+ . See, for example, Cozic (2006) and 
Halpern and Pucella (2011). Elliott (2019a) shows that for the fully general result to 
hold, Ω+ needs to include not only logically impossible worlds, but also ‘incomplete’ 
worlds—i.e., worlds that leave some matters unspecified. So perhaps comparativists 
might maintain the measurement analogy if they let propositions be characterised as 
sets of possible and impossible/incomplete worlds.
I have raised this objection only to acknowledge it, and then set it aside. In other 
works, I have argued that letting Ω include logically impossible worlds creates 
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special problems in the probabilistic context (Elliott 2019a), and will in fact severely 
undermine the comparativist’s analogy with the measurement of length rather than 
support it (Elliott 2019b). I won’t repeat those arguments here, but let me add two 
further points.
First, impossible worlds aren’t going to help with any of the problems discussed 
in Sects. 3.1–3.4, where ≿ is probabilistically representable. Second, and more 
importantly, if saving the measurement analogy from the threat of irrational confi-
dence rankings requires the use of logically impossible and incomplete worlds, then 
that is a significant theoretical cost for the view. There are general reasons to worry 
about the use of sets of possible and impossible/incomplete worlds as models of 
belief content (e.g. Bjerring 2014; Bjerring and Schwarz 2017), so comparativists 
might not want to put all their eggs into this one basket.
4.2  Approximating Probabilistic Agreement
While Sally’s confidence ranking doesn’t support the measurement analogy exactly 
in Example 4, it at least approximates one that does. So maybe we could use the 
cardinal information extracted from the probabilistically representable ranking or 
rankings that ≿ most closely approximates to explain how Sally’s beliefs still man-
age to support some indeterminate form of cardinal information? (cf. Stefánsson 
2017, p. 576, fn. 6.)
Now, if the goal were merely to explain how Sally’s beliefs contain some car-
dinal information or other, whether determinate or indeterminate, then something 
like this kind of response to Example 4 might suffice. But the point of Example 4 
was not that comparativism has no way of making sense of cardinal information 
in some form whenever ≿ doesn’t satisfy monotonicity. Of course there are many 
ways one might preserve some semblance of cardinality in these cases. That’s obvi-
ous—what’s not obvious is whether this will be enough. My argument was that the 
SCEC cannot get us the right cardinal information in cases like this—specifically, 
cases where (1) Sally’s confidence ranking does not agree with any additive func-
tion, yet (2) at least one non-additive function seems to do a good job of represent-
ing her partial beliefs as reflected by fit with the facts about her preferences.
Sally’s confidence ranking in Example 4 will indeed approximate a ranking that 
agrees with some probability function; for instance,
And pr will in turn approximate irr . But—and this is the important point—it won’t 
be irr . It’s not implausible to think that irr represents a possible system of beliefs 
with determinate cardinal information, especially inasmuch as that information 
might be reflected in the consequences it has for Sally’s preferences. According to 
irr , Sally has the same confidence regarding Q1 ∪… ∪ Q101 as she does regarding 
P1 ∪… ∪ P100 ; according to pr , she doesn’t. So pr misrepresents her beliefs, and 
moreover it generates the wrong predictions about her preferences. So how, exactly, 
is an approximation like pr going to help us get at the right cardinal information?




Next up is what we might call disjunctivism. The idea is this: if ≿ doesn’t satisfy 
the requisite structural and/or existential assumptions needed for the measure-
ment analogy under the assumption that it’s the union of disjoint propositions 
that’s serving as the doxastic analogue of addition, then perhaps there will be an 
alternative operation we could appeal to in those cases instead. We thus have a 
disjunctive explanation of cardinality: we let the union of disjoint propositions be 
our doxastic analogue of addition whenever the right conditions obtain, and look 
elsewhere when they don’t.
Obviously, disjunctivism won’t be enough to solve any of the problems raised 
in Sects. 3.1–3.4, which involve ordinally-equivalent pairs of representations. But 
more importantly, disjunctivism undermines one of comparativism’s main sell-
ing points. What makes the SCEC compelling—to the extent that it is—is that 
it’s straightforwardly analogous to the well-established explanations of cardi-
nal information that we find in the case of basic physical quantities like length 
or mass. But there’s nothing at all like disjunctivism for any quantities in the 
sciences—i.e., where we sometimes appeal to one operation as the real-world 
analogue of addition, and sometimes appeal to another, depending on whatever 
works in the moment. The reason for this is obvious: it would make the meaning 
of cardinal information for that quantity too unstable.
The same applies to comparative beliefs. If different operations on proposi-
tions are supposed to explain cardinality for different agents, with the choice of 
each operation being contingent on what’s appropriate for that agent’s idiosyn-
cratic confidence ranking, then both interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons 
of belief would become quite useless in general. Before we could know what it 
means for Sally to believe P twice as much as Q, we would first have to take 
into account her entire confidence ranking, work out what the relevant operation 
should be, and only then give some doxastic meaning to the statement. Without 
knowledge of the overall structure of her confidence ranking, then, such a claim 
would only tell us: 
1. P ≻ Q
2. There’s some binary operation ◦ on  that shares certain structural characteristics 
with + relative to ≿ such that for Q′,Q′′ where Q ∼ Q� ∼ Q�� , Q�◦Q�� = P
The latter is utterly uninformative, and the former we don’t need cardinal infor-
mation to express! Worse still, there’s no guarantee that the cardinal information 
we get out will track the most obvious implications of believing P twice as much 
as Q (e.g. being willing to bet twice as much on the former as on the latter). Dis-
junctivism is a non-starter.
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4.4  ‘I Only Want to Model Ideally Rational Agents’
A final response to examples that involve non-ideal agents is to limit the intended 
explanatory scope of comparativism. The basic idea behind this response is that 
we can (at least for now) safely ignore irrational agents for the purposes of cur-
rent philosophical theorising. There seem to be two versions of this thought: first, 
that we can ignore non-ideal agents because what matters for most contemporary 
philosophical purposes is that we have an explanation of cardinality for ideally 
rational agents; or second, that at this stage it’s perfectly reasonable to limit our 
theories to cases of ideal rationality where we can expect matters to be simpler 
and more manageable, and de-idealise at some point later on once we’ve got a 
handle on the easier cases. In support of both versions of the response, though, 
it’s noted that the SCEC does seem to work well for ideally rational agents—
at least when there are sufficiently many ‘confidence-duplicates’ to guarantee 
unique probabilistic agreement.
Probabilism tells us that an ideally rational agent will have at least n times as 
much confidence in P as in Q if she has at least as much confidence in P as she 
does in R1 ∪ … ∪ Rn , where the R1,… ,Rn are disjoint and R1 ∼ … ∼ Rn ∼ Q . 
So probabilism predicts that the SCEC will generate the right results for ideally 
rational agents. But probabilism is common ground for most comparativists and 
non-comparativists alike. So the question is whether this fact reflects some interest-
ing explanatory relationship between the meaning of ‘n times as much confidence’ 
and confidence rankings over disjoint unions, or whether it’s just a consequence of 
the claim that a rational system of partial beliefs ought to be representable by a func-
tion that satisfies additivity.
If it does reflect an interesting explanatory relationship, then presumably that 
same relationship should also hold for non-ideal agents. We don’t want to have a 
disjunctivist explanation, with one kind of theory for the ideal agent and a wholly 
separate theory for the non-ideal agent. Moreover, it would be unreasonable to say 
that Sally doesn’t have partial beliefs encoding interesting cardinal information just 
because she isn’t ideally rational. I have partial beliefs with meaningful cardinal 
information, and I’m far from ideally rational. So, comparativists should be able to 
show at least that the SCEC or something much like it is plausibly generalisable. 
For if there doesn’t seem much hope for generalising the SCEC to non-ideal agents, 
then we’ve got good reasons to think that the explanation is false—even in the case 
of ideally rational agents.
In Sect. 3.5, I’ve discussed cases where ≿ fails to satisfy monotonicity. In (Elli-
ott 2019b) I’ve shown that it’s possible to generalise the SCEC to some degree, such 
that ≿ need only satisfy a weaker condition r-coherence. However it’s also shown 
in that work that r-coherence is a minimal condition on any (non-disjunctive) 
explanation of cardinality that preserves the basic structure of the SCEC in cases 
where ≿ is uniquely probabilistically representable. Both Example 4 and the case 
of the conjunction fallacy involve confidence rankings that fail to satisfy r-coher-
ence under very natural assumptions. The upshot is that the strategy of the SCEC 




It seems, then, that the prospects for generalising the SCEC to non-ideal agents 
are not particularly strong. Or at the very least: constructing a plausible explana-
tion of cardinal information that extends to both ideal and non-ideal, potentially irra-
tional agents remains a serious challenge for comparativism.
5  Supplemented Comparativism
Let supplemented comparativism denote the view that partial beliefs supervene on 
comparative beliefs plus something else (whatever that may be, so long as it doesn’t 
trivialise the whole affair). Some obvious possibilities might be:
• Judgement-supplemented comparativism the facts about Sally’s beliefs are deter-
mined by her comparative beliefs and her qualitative judgements regarding prob-
abilistic dependence and/or evidential relationships; for instance, that P is evi-
dence for Q. (We’ll call these ‘evidential-dependence judgements’.)8
• Evidence-supplemented comparativism the facts about Sally’s beliefs are deter-
mined by her comparative beliefs and her history of evidence.
• Preference-supplemented comparativism the facts about Sally’s beliefs are deter-
mined by her comparative beliefs plus facts relating to her preferences.9
Will some version of supplemented comparativism fare better in response to the 
above problems than non-supplemented comparativism?
I cannot discuss every possible style of supplemented comparativism, so allow 
me instead to make a few general points on the matter. First, it’s important to be 
clear what the problems are supposed to be. In particular, I want to distinguish 
between the following two challenges for comparativism: 
1. Granularity there seem to be meaningfully distinct systems of partial belief that 
correspond to the same system of comparative belief
2. Cardinality there seems to be meaningful cardinal information in some systems 
of partial belief that the SCEC cannot explain
Now it’s obvious that some form of supplemented comparativism will be better 
placed to deal with the granularity challenge. Trivially, if ≿ doesn’t contain enough 
information to determine the facts about her beliefs, then ≿ plus something else 
might. That’s not very interesting, and without a detailed theory to play with it’s 
hard to say much more on the matter. But the target of my arguments throughout has 
8 This kind of view is briefly suggested in Joyce (2010, p. 288).
9 A representation theorem similar to that of Joyce (1999) might help in providing the foundations 
for preference-supplemented comparativism. Of the three potential ‘supplemented comparativisms’ 
noted here, I think this is the most plausible. With that said, it is also a theory that fits most naturally 
with explaining cardinal information in partial belief by the theory of additive conjoint measurement 
(Sect. 2.3)—not the SCEC.
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been the SCEC, and supplemented comparativism isn’t going to help save the SCEC 
from those arguments.
Consider judgement-supplemented comparativism, and recall Example 1: Sally 
is almost omniscient, but she has much more confidence that the actual world is 1 
than that it’s 2 . Now imagine that Sally’s evidential-dependence judgements are 
such that the uniquely correct probabilistic representation pr of her beliefs must be 
such that pr({𝜔1}) ≫ pr({𝜔2}) . Sally’s friend Bob has the same confidence rank-
ing, but his dependence judgements are such that his uniquely best probabilistic rep-
resentation pr′ is such that pr�({1}) ≈ pr�({2}) . Great: judgement-supplemented 
comparativism has managed to make distinctions between belief states where ordi-
nary non-supplemented comparativism could not. Of course it can—it has more 
resources to play with.
But what explains the sense in which Sally has much more confidence that the 
actual world is 1 , while Bob doesn’t? The fact that pr({𝜔1}) ≫ pr({𝜔2}) and 
pr�({1}) ≈ pr
�({2}) does not constitute an explanation, no matter how unique pr 
and pr′ happen to be relative to Sally’s and Bob’s confidence rankings plus eviden-
tial-dependence judgements. The reason should by now be clear: the numbers are 
irrelevant. The mere fact that judgement-supplemented comparativism can distin-
guish between ordinally-equivalent representations of partial belief does not thereby 
entail that it has a satisfactory explanation of the cardinal information those distinc-
tive representations seem to capture. Either ‘much more confidence’ reflects in a 
natural way some underlying real-world relationship that’s independent of the num-
bers we use to represent it, or it’s meaningless. So what is the real-world relation-
ship that explains the cardinal information apparently present in Sally’s (or Bob’s) 
beliefs?
Obviously, the judgement-supplemented comparativist cannot make appeal to the 
SCEC, because in cases of almost omniscience there aren’t enough disjoint proposi-
tions at varying ranks around to ‘add’. The same applies for Example 2: no explana-
tion in terms of the structure of ≿ can account for the differences in cardinal infor-
mation between Sally’s beliefs at t1 and t2 , simply because there are no differences in 
Sally’s comparative beliefs at t1 and at t2 . For the same reason, no such explanation 
can account for the differences in cardinal information that seem to be represented 
in the differences between pr , pyr , and cap (from Sects. 3.3–3.4), since these are 
ordinally equivalent.
Judgement-supplemented comparativism owes us a compelling and general 
explanation of cardinal information just as much as non-supplemented comparativ-
ism does. I don’t know what such an explanation would look like, and frankly I’m 
doubtful that the judgement-supplemented comparativist will be able to come up 
with one that’s as intuitively compelling and consonant with standard methodologies 
as the SCEC was supposed to be.10 But that’s neither here nor there. The main target 
10 There isn’t anything in the measurement theorist’s toolkit that we could use to explain cardinal infor-
mation in terms of a confidence ranking ≿ plus a non-transitive evidential-dependence relation R. A new 
measurement theory could perhaps be developed, but I do not know how. Moreover, and as I’ve noted, 
part of the SCEC’s appeal is it’s continuity with standard methodologies. If judgement-supplemented 
comparativism requires a whole new theory of measurement just to make sense of partial belief, then 
that’s surely a cost for the view.
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of my arguments has been the SCEC, and the SCEC is just as problematic for judge-
ment-supplemented comparativism as it is for non-supplmented comparativism.
The very same points apply, for the very same reasons, to any other variety of 
X-supplemented comparativism you care to think of. The fundamental problem is 
that the SCEC appeals only to comparative beliefs over disjoint unions. Regardless 
of whatever else we throw into the supervenience base for partial beliefs, the SCEC 
cannot account for differences in cardinal information represented in distinct but 
ordinally-equivalent representations of partial belief; nor can it account for cardinal-
ity in cases where the comparative beliefs lack the requisite structure. No ‘further 
fact’ view is going to magically make the SCEC apply even when Sally’s confidence 
ranking fails to satisfy monotonicity, or when there aren’t enough ‘confidence-
duplicates’ around to ‘add’. A different style of explanation is needed.
If the only takeaway messages of this paper are (a) the facts about partial beliefs 
carry more information than the facts about comparative beliefs, and moreover (b) 
the SCEC is inadequate, then I’ll be happy. The central challenge that I’ve been 
pushing is that comparativism currently lacks an adequate explanation of cardinal 
information. Until such time as supplemented comparativism offers us something 
new, that challenge extends to it as well.
6  Conclusion
Koopman was right about this at least: the numbers we use to refer to and reason 
about strengths of beliefs are not essential to them. Nobody thinks that there are 
numbers literally in the head—that numerical strengths of beliefs are somehow met-
aphysically sui generis and we just have to treat their ratios and intervals as intrinsi-
cally meaningful. All parties to this debate agree that the numbers are just a way 
of representing strengths of belief, while their ratios and intervals must in addition 
represent some closely related and fundamentally non-numerical psychological phe-
nomenon by virtue of some abstract structure that phenomenon shares with the rel-
evant numerical operations and relations. The hard part is saying what that structure 
could be.
Whatever the right account is, though, I think it’s unlikely to be found in the mea-
gre resources allowed by (non-supplemented) comparativism. I doubt that the stand-
ard comparativist explanation of cardinality correctly locates the actual qualitative 
phenomena that underlies how our partial beliefs come to carry meaningful cardi-
nal information. The purported analogy between the measurement of beliefs and the 
measurement of length is deeply misleading. A better explanation is needed.
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